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INTRODUCTION
In her elegant and lively address, Chief Judge Wood suggests exposing
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982 to hear all appeals
from patent cases, to competition from other appellate courts.1 Under Judge
Wood’s proposal, parties would have the choice of seeking review either in the
regional circuit in which the district court was located or in the Federal Circuit.2
Judge Wood indicates that the Federal Circuit would likely “still play a leading
role in shaping patent law,” with regional courts simply allowing room for new
ideas and allowing for fuller development of issues before they reach the
Supreme Court.3 Judge Wood would also institute consolidation procedures to
address concerns about parties filing different appeals in different circuits over
the same patent.4 In some respects, therefore, Judge Wood’s proposal could be
seen as relatively modest.
In patent circles, by contrast, proposals to give regional courts any role in
the development of patent law have generally been viewed as modest only in the
Swiftian sense. Where Judge Wood sees beneficial competition and
experimentation, many patent lawyers see unsustainable levels of uncertainty.
Patent lawyers won the debate in the early 1980s. Congress was
convinced of the need to promote greater uniformity and certainty through
centralization.5 In general, proponents of uniformity and predictability have on
their side elements of historical tradition that equate patents not simply with
property, but with a very specific vision of inviolable tangible property. 6
*
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Although these historical accounts are in tension with post-realist
understandings of how property law works,7 and arguably in tension with the
utilitarian goals of patent law, they enjoy considerable appeal nationally and are
regularly deployed by U.S. government actors in international fora.8
Considerations of political economy are not on Judge Wood’s side.
Legislative prospects aside, Judge Wood’s proposal does pose sharply the
normative question of whether (and to what extent) the Federal Circuit needs
competition. In this response, I argue that competition is indeed desirable.
Whether such competition is best provided through additional appellate courts is
unclear, however. In any event, given our current structure, the more tractable
approach is to improve competitive input from sources that have already
emerged. These include dissenting Federal Circuit judges, parties and amici who
are not “patent insiders,” and perhaps, above all, the executive branch.

I. WHY COMPETITION IS DESIRABLE
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has
taken seriously the vision of uniformity and predictability articulated by
Congress in 1982. The court’s often formalistic jurisprudence9 and its frequent
emphasis on stare decisis, arguably promote the Congressional vision.
Additionally, where panels have diverged significantly, or where dissents in
three-judge panels have called out important differences of opinion among
judges, the CAFC has often convened en banc panels in an attempt to iron out
differences.10 In fact, even where the CAFC has created vertical uncertainty—
for example, by reviewing de novo factual questions already decided by district

7
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2004) (discussing the many ways in which property law “is not as
absolute as is often claimed”); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s
Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1998) (noting that “Blackstone himself was thoroughly
aware of . . . pervasive and serious qualifications on exclusive dominion.”); cf. Adam
Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 2001 (2009) (criticizing legal realists’ arguments against Lockean theory, including
arguments based on patents).
8
Arti K. Rai, U.S. Executive Branch Patent Policy, Global and Domestic, in PATENT
LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 85, 88–91 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley, eds.,
2014).
9
See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 75–81
(2010) (contrasting the Supreme Court’s “holistic” jurisprudence with Federal Circuit
formalism).
10
See, e.g., Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit
En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 736–39 (2011) (finding that the Federal Circuit takes
patent cases en banc more frequently than other appellate courts take their en banc).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478457

388

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

[Vol. 13

courts,11 it has defended itself by invoking horizontal certainty. Under this
argument, de novo review of both legal and factual issues promotes horizontal
certainty by ensuring that the CAFC resolves in a uniform fashion any
divergence that emerges from evaluation of the same patent by different district
courts.12 Although the CAFC’s arguments are, in my view, ultimately flawed,
the CAFC is hardly unaware of the virtues of certainty.
How well the court has done on other desirable goals—most notably,
setting up a regime that, within the limits of statutory language, promotes
innovation—is less clear. Although formalism, uniformity, and predictability
can promote innovation, they can also retard it.
Consider the one-time Federal Circuit requirement that proof of nonobviousness require a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (TSM) to combine
prior art. By the late 1990s, the Federal Circuit was not only employing this test
regularly, but it was often employing a particularly formalistic version of the
doctrine that required a written TSM. Although the results of such a doctrine
may have been uniform and predictable, the equally predictable result of
reducing non-obviousness to mere novelty was a proliferation of trivial patents.
More generally, as the court’s jurisprudence of non-obviousness has shown,
expertise in the “law” of patents does not imply expertise in relevant economic
and scientific questions.
For its part, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) vigorously contested
the Federal Circuit’s application of a written TSM requirement. In a wave of
cases, the PTO unsuccessfully defended before the Federal Circuit examiner
decisions that invoked common knowledge rather than written TSM as their
basis for combining prior art.13 However, the agency did not immediately
position itself as a clear competitor to the Federal Circuit. It declined to appeal
its losses to the Supreme Court. As Judge Wood’s analysis might suggest, and as
Craig Nard and John Duffy have explicitly argued,14 the agency may have been
reluctant to directly challenge a court with a monopoly on intermediate appellate
scrutiny. Historically, the PTO’s position has been particularly weak because it
has not been given Chevron deference on questions of substantive law.
11
See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1791, 1830–41 (2013) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s active role as a
fact-finder).
12
The majority and dissent in the Federal Circuit’s most recent en banc opinion on
patent claim construction respectively argue the case for horizontal certainty and vertical
certainty. Lightning Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
13
See, e.g., In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
14
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1641 (2007) (“[T]he PTO is, as a practical matter, subordinate
to the court. This routine relationship may make the PTO hesitant to challenge the
Federal Circuit frequently or vigorously.”).
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That said, the executive branch as a whole, speaking through the Solicitor
General, did ultimately assert itself forcefully as a competitor to the Federal
Circuit. In response to the Court’s “call for the views of the Solicitor General”
(CVSG) in the 2007 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. case,15 the government argued
in favor of a certiorari grant on the grounds that the PTO should “be allowed to
bring to bear its full expertise—including its reckoning of the basic knowledge
and common sense possessed by persons in particular fields of endeavor—when
making the predictive judgment whether an invention would have been obvious
to a person of ordinary skill in the art.”16 In keeping with the government’s
position, the Supreme Court not only granted certiorari but ultimately held that
“[r]igid preventative rules that deny [factfinders] recourse to common sense are
neither necessary under, nor consistent with, this Court’s case law.”17
How might the case have come out differently under Judge Wood’s
proposed regime? Under Wood’s proposal, a competitor court might have
adopted a position that diverged from that of the Federal Circuit. A divergent
ruling by a competitor appellate court might have forced the KSR issue upon the
Supreme Court more quickly. Additionally, once the Supreme Court took the
case, it would have had the benefit of opinions, and perhaps even a certain
amount of litigation practice, under two different regimes.
As Judge Wood herself notes, however, under her proposal “[t]he
absolute number of patent cases that would return to the regional courts would
not be large.”18 By definition, then, any given circuit would probably see a very
small number of patent cases. Under those circumstances, no circuit would be
likely to emerge as a forceful or nimble competitor. For this reason, Professors
Craig Nard and John Duffy, who have also argued for appellate competition
(and who Judge Wood cites), suggest an “optimization” strategy under which
two or three appellate courts would compete to develop patent law.19

II. WOULD ADDITIONAL APPELLATE COURTS BE WORTHWHILE?
In 1982, two or three appellate courts might have been an option worth
considering, particularly if any uncertainty posed by such an option had been
countered through greater centralization and development of expertise at the trial
level. As discussed in Part III, however, competition in the appellate process is
not an obviously superior choice for marshalling relevant evidence. In any
event, over thirty years later, the cost-benefit analysis is different. Even without
15

Supreme Court docket for KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/041350.htm (last visited May 27, 2014).
16
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26, KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453601.
17
KSR Int’l, 127 S. Ct. at 1732.
18
Wood, supra note 1, at 10.
19
See Nard & Duffy, supra note 14, at 1637–41.
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circuit splits, the Supreme Court now takes at least a few patent cases every
year. This pattern emerged in 2006, and it currently shows no sign of abating.
In lieu of circuit splits, the Supreme Court appears to rely on the presence
of vigorous participation by industry amici at the certiorari stage,20 dissents in
three-judge panel and en banc Federal Circuit decisions,21 and perhaps, above
all, the views of the executive branch. Indeed, in his recent work, Professor
Duffy highlights the role of the Solicitor General in counseling the Court
regarding which issues to take and how to rule on those issues.22 I have built on
Professor Duffy’s work to show how, in various important cases, the Solicitor
General represents not simply the PTO, but also a number of other agencies with
interests in patent questions.23 Unlike the PTO, these other agencies are not
likely to see themselves as subordinate to the Federal Circuit. Moreover, while
the PTO has sometimes been accused of having “pro-patent” tendencies,
executive branch agencies like the National Institute of Health and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (not to mention independent agencies like
the Federal Trade Commission) cannot be viewed as “pro-patent.”
The executive branch’s role as a very significant competitor of the
Federal Circuit is now clear. From 1996 through June 2013, the executive
branch participated either as a party or an amicus in twenty-three of twenty-six
cases taken by the Court. Of the fourteen cases in which the executive branch
disagreed with the Federal Circuit, the executive branch’s position prevailed in
all but two.
For purposes of promoting diverse views in patent litigation, one of these
executive branch victories, the 2007 Supreme Court case of MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc.,24 may be particularly notable. While MedImmune’s affirmation
20

For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 1843, 1843
(2011), which addressed the “presumption of validity” accorded to granted patents, the
Court may have been influenced by industry amicus briefs criticizing the rule enunciated
by the Federal Circuit. The Court granted certiorari in that case even without any
apparent dissent within the Federal Circuit or from the executive branch.
21
See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653
F.3d 1329, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, J., dissenting); Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d
1320, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting); Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharma.
Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting); CLS Bank Int’l v.
Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (multiple
concurrences and dissents).
22
John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 518, 519 (2010) (“The innovative jurisdiction structure of the new
appellate court has fostered a unique relationship between the Federal Circuit and the
Solicitor General’s Office and has, in a subtle but meaningful way, shifted power over the
development of patent law to the executive branch of the government.”).
23
Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1244–48 (2012).
24
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
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of licensee standing to sue for patent invalidity does not throw open the
courthouse doors to all who might wish to challenge patents, it does suggest a
greater openness to new types of challengers. In addition to patent skeptics from
the information technology industry, 25 new voices such as the American Civil
Liberties Union, which represented the Association of Molecular Pathologists in
the 2013 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.26 gene
patent case, are likely to make non-traditional arguments. One doesn’t have to
agree with those arguments (and I do not)27 to agree that they deserve
consideration. Indeed, in the case of the patent eligibility of genes, a significant
problem was that the litigating parties in the pre-MedImmune era, all of whom
had gene patents, had no incentive to make arguments that gene patents, as a
category, failed to promote innovation. Thus, these arguments arose only
decades after the PTO started granting patents on genes, with the perhaps
predictable result that Federal Circuit judges invoked stare decisis and
retroactivity as reasons for upholding even patents that they might not allowed
“on a blank canvas.”28

III. ASSESSING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ROLE
Of course, competition from the executive branch is not the same as
competition within Article III courts. Only competition from another appellate
court can create a “laboratory” in which different approaches to patent law are
tested. Indeed, Judge Wood’s brief reference to random assignment of appeals
hints at the possibility of a true natural experiment.29
Absent competing appellate courts that might provide a “real world”
variation that the Supreme Court could analyze, some have suggested that the
Court’s role should be relatively circumscribed.30 I am not so sure. The Court
25

See generally Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends
Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395, 421–22 (2011)
(finding that in Federal Circuit and amicus briefs, only 5% of briefs filed by hightechnology firms favored the patentee, as contrasted with 98% filed by patent holding
firms).
26
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
27
Arti K. Rai, Biomedical Patents at the Supreme Court, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
111,
114–15
(Oct.
11,
2013),
available
at
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/RaiSLR.pdf.
28
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring) (“If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I
might conclude that an isolated DNA sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not
patentable subject matter.”).
29
Wood, supra note 1, at 9–10.
30
See, e.g., John Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription
for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657 (2009) (arguing
that because the Supreme Court lacks a deep foundation in patent law, it should issue
limited decisions).
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can obviously make important contributions in those cases where it is called
upon to decide power allocation between different patent institutions, or to
ensure that patent law does not become divorced from other areas of law.31 As
for cases at the core of substantive patent law, such as non-obviousness
jurisprudence, input from the executive branch can signal to the Supreme Court
that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence has veered significantly off course and
suggest the type of intervention that is necessary. In general, with the notable
exception of certain cases involving the notoriously difficult question of Section
101 patent eligibility,32 the Supreme Court has done a reasonable job with many
questions of substantive patent law.
Notably, in at least some respects, competition from a coordinate branch
may have advantages that competition from an appellate court would not yield.
At least in theory, a coordinate branch, and perhaps especially the executive
branch, can bring to bear expertise that no Article III court possesses. In the area
of patent law, the relevant expertise is economic and scientific. Thus far, with
the possible exception of cases like Myriad and F.T.C. v. Actavis,33 executive
branch briefing at the Supreme Court has not relied heavily on such expertise. In
prior writing, I have proposed a more assertive White House presence on
questions of innovation policy.34 One of the many benefits of such a presence
would be greater marshaling of agency expertise in patent cases before the
Supreme Court.
A skeptic might reasonably fear that the currently productive relationship
between the Supreme Court and the executive branch could wither. For
example, if agencies other than the PTO were to become less interested in
Supreme Court review, the PTO on its own terms might be reluctant to
challenge the Federal Circuit. For this reason, it may be particularly important
for the executive branch to make a convincing argument before the Court that
the post-grant review proceedings set up by American Invents Act of 2011 35
give the PTO the authority to make substantive patent law determinations that

31
See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (deciding allocation of power
between PTO and the Federal Circuit as well as relationship between patent law and
administrative law); eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (examining the
Federal Circuit’s patent remedies jurisprudence).
32
See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
33
F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
34
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008).
35
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
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merit Chevron deference.36 For purposes of improving competition for the
“patent court,” a test case raising this issue will be important to watch.
Competition through executive branch input does raise the important
question of whether political considerations unrelated to (or even antithetical to)
innovation could sway the executive branch. Although Chevron is premised in
part on principles of political accountability, and innovation is hardly the only
legitimate goal of government, I agree with the conventional wisdom that patent
law is best understood as a regime that exists to promote innovation. To the
extent that the executive branch was advancing arguments unrelated to
innovation, or making abrupt changes in position following a presidential
election, assertive judicial review would be important. Indeed, even if the
Federal Circuit (or more likely the Supreme Court) were to accept Chevron as
the applicable framework under certain circumstances, courts could reject
certain executive branch arguments as either unreasonable under step 2 of
Chevron or “arbitrary and capricious” within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act.

CONCLUSION
Judge Wood’s address is a timely and important reminder of the virtues of
competition in patent law. Even if it does not result in additional appellate
competition, it should prompt further consideration of how to improve the value
provided by existing sources, most notably the executive branch.

36
See, e.g., Melissa Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1959 (2013) (arguing that certain
American Invents Act procedures are sufficiently formal to merit Chevron deference);
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA: What the Patent System
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 320–28 (2007) (arguing that, as a
positive and normative matter, the results of post-grant review procedures being proposed
at the time should receive Chevron deference).

